Publications
- Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism, with Sung-Ho Cho, Miyuki Koshimura, Kentaro Yahiro, and Makoto Yokoo.
Economics Letters, 217:110675. [Journal] - Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: A new characterization, with Souvik Roy.
International Economic Review (2022), 63(1):261-290. [Journal] - On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options, with Souvik Roy.
Economics Letters, 211:110239. [Journal]
Working Papers
- Equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability [pdf] (Job Market Paper)
- Simple dominance of top trading cycles, revision requested at International Journal of Game Theory. [pdf]
- Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness: A single-peaked preferences investigation, revision requested at Economic Theory. [pdf]
- Efficient reallocation of indivisible resources: Pair-efficiency versus Pareto-efficiency, submitted. [pdf]
- On percolation in a generalized backbend process, with Souvik Roy. [pdf]
- Matchings under stability, minimum regret, and forced and forbidden pairs in marriage problem, with Souvik Roy. [pdf]
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked, with Souvik Roy. [pdf]
Work in Progress
- Trading houses in a network, with Szilvia Papai.
- Incentive properties under stability
- Maximal domains for stable and strategy-proof matching rules in marriage problem
