Publications
- Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness: A single-peaked preferences investigation
Economic Theory (2025), 80(4):1297-1327 - Efficient reallocation of indivisible resources: Pair-efficiency versus Pareto-efficiency
Journal of Mathematical Economics (2025), 119:103149 - Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism, with Sung-Ho Cho, Miyuki Koshimura, Kentaro Yahiro, and Makoto Yokoo
Economics Letters (2022), 217:110675 - Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: A new characterization, with Souvik Roy
International Economic Review (2022), 63(1):261-290 - On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options, with Souvik Roy
Economics Letters (2022), 211:110239
Working Papers
- Simple dominance of top trading cycles
Revised and resubmitted at International Journal of Game Theory - Equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability
- Matchings under stability, minimum regret, and forced and forbidden pairs in marriage problem, with Souvik Roy
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked, with Souvik Roy
- On percolation in a generalized backbend process, with Souvik Roy
Work in Progress
- Trading houses in a network, with Szilvia Papai
- Incentive properties under stability
- Maximal domains for stable and strategy-proof matching rules in marriage problem
