Publications & Forthcoming
  1. Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism, with Sung-Ho Cho, Miyuki Koshimura, Kentaro Yahiro, and Makoto Yokoo.
    Economics Letters, 217:110675. [Journal]
  2. Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: A new characterization, with Souvik Roy. 
    International Economic Review (2022), 63(1):261-290. [Journal] [MPRA]
  3. On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options, with Souvik Roy. 
    ​Economics Letters, 211:110239. [Journal]
Working Papers
  1. Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness with single-peaked preferences on trees [arXiv]
  2. Simple dominance of fixed priority top trading cycles [arXiv]
  3. Incentive properties of deferred acceptance
  4. Maximal domains for stable and strategy-proof matching rules in marriage problem
  5. On percolation in a generalized backbend process, with Souvik Roy. [arXiv]
  6. Matchings under stability, minimum regret, and forced and forbidden pairs in marriage problem, with Souvik Roy. [MPRA]
  7. Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked, with Souvik Roy. [MPRA]