Publications & Forthcoming
- Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism, with Sung-Ho Cho, Miyuki Koshimura, Kentaro Yahiro, and Makoto Yokoo.
Economics Letters, 217:110675. [Journal]
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: A new characterization, with Souvik Roy.
International Economic Review (2022), 63(1):261-290. [Journal] [MPRA]
- On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options, with Souvik Roy.
Economics Letters, 211:110239. [Journal]
- Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness with single-peaked preferences on trees [arXiv]
- Simple dominance of fixed priority top trading cycles [arXiv]
- Incentive properties of deferred acceptance
- Maximal domains for stable and strategy-proof matching rules in marriage problem
- On percolation in a generalized backbend process, with Souvik Roy. [arXiv]
- Matchings under stability, minimum regret, and forced and forbidden pairs in marriage problem, with Souvik Roy. [MPRA]
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked, with Souvik Roy. [MPRA]